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Delivering healthcare infrastructure and services through public private 
partnerships – the Lesotho case  
Dr. Mark Hellowell, Director, Global Health Policy Unit, University of Edinburgh 
 
ABSTRACT 
Many governments in Africa are establishing public-private partnerships (PPPs) to provide 
healthcare infrastructure and services. We know very little about how healthcare PPPs are 
planned and implemented in Africa, and even less about the associated outcomes. This 
paper begins to address this gap through a detailed case study of an innovative, ambitious 
and complex partnership contract in Maseru, Lesotho. The scheme has been labelled ‘the 
future of healthcare delivery on the African continent’ and encompasses the design, build, 
partial financing and full operation of a new hospital facility alongside a wide range of core 
clinical services. This chapter draws on documentary data to evaluate the main features of 
the contract, the procurement process and monitoring arrangements, and the outcomes in 
terms of benefits and costs. A key finding is that payments to the private operator are far 
higher than was expected pre-contractually, and have become a major source of budgetary 
uncertainty, as well as a demanding call on government’s healthcare resources. We 
conclude that successful social infrastructure PPPs in Africa will require considerable 
investments in contract management skills, strong budgeting institutions and mechanisms, 
and enhanced (and more independent) scrutiny of plans and forecasts of financial impacts. 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Many governments in Africa are seeking to establish public-private partnerships (PPPs) to 
provide social infrastructure and services. There is a substantial body of research on PPPs in 
high-income countries, but we know very little about how these initiatives are planned and 
implemented in these low and middle income countries (LMICs), and still less about the 
associated outcomes. These are important lacunae given the distinctive set of challenges 
that long-term, complex and capital-intensive transactions may give rise to in African 
countries. This paper begins to address these gaps through a detailed case study of a project 
in Lesotho, in southern Africa. This is an ‘integrated’ PPP scheme (see Table 1) that 
incorporates the financing and construction of a 425-bed national referral facility (the 
Queen ‘Mamohato Memorial Hospital), a gateway clinic and three urban ‘filter’ clinics 
alongside a comprehensive range of clinical services to be delivered over a 16 year period. 
The contract is unusual in combining the private delivery of new healthcare infrastructure 
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alongside a wide range of clinical activities. As such, it was described as ‘an innovative and 
sustainable model for governments across sub-Saharan Africa’ by Jean Philippe Prosper, 
Director for Eastern and Southern Africa at the International Finance Corporation (the 
private finance arm of the World Bank Group), and as ‘the future of healthcare delivery on 
the African continent’ by Richard Friedland, chief executive officer of Netcare, the majority 
shareholder of the eventual private operator (International Finance Corporation, 2010; 
Netcare Limited, 2012).This chapter draws on documentary data to evaluate:  
1 The financial, contractual and technical features of the contract 
2 The structure of the market through which it was established and the adequacy 
of the monitoring and evaluation arrangements  
3 The outcomes in terms of benefits and costs for the wider healthcare system.1 
The article concludes with an outline of policy implications for decision-makers and 
practitioners in Africa. 
 
Table 1. A typology of public-private partnerships in the healthcare sector 
PPP Category Common term (examples) Definition 
Service  Operating contract (Spain, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, UK, 
Nigeria; many instances of 
primary care contracting in 
various African countries). 
A private operator is 
contracted to operate and 
deliver (wholly or partly) 
publicly-funded healthcare in 
a publicly-owned facility. 
Facility/finance PFI, PPP, P3 (Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Mexico, France, Italy, 
Portugal, South Africa, UK). 
A public agency contracts a 
private operator to design, 
build, finance and operate a 
hospital facility. Most clinical 
services within this are 
provided by government. 
Integrated PPP (elective and 
diagnostic treatment 
centres in England, the 
‘Alzira’ hospital model in 
A private operator builds or 
leases a facility and provides 
free (or heavily subsidised) 
healthcare services to a 
defined population. 
                                                          
1 The author was part of a team of researchers that conducted an evaluation of the World Bank’s role in the 
project as part of the Bank’s Implementation and Completion Report(ICR)(World Bank, 2013). Much of the data 
collected as part of that assignment is owned by the Bank and is not in the public domain. The case study 
reported in this chapter is therefore based on an analysis of publicly available data (including the ICR itself). 
3 
 
Spain,2 hospital and 
primary care services in 
Maseru, Lesotho). 
Co-location Co-location (England, 
Lesotho, Nigeria, Mexico, 
Spain). 
A public agency allocates a 
portion of a hospital’s land or 
premises for use by a private 
operator in exchange for 
payment and specified 
benefits to the agency. 
 
Source: Adapted from Montagu and Harding (2012) 
 
 
 
 
2  CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE PPP MODEL IN AFRICA 
 
The financial case for the PPP model resides in its ability to allocate the risks of delivering 
infrastructure and services more effectively than alternative methods. This requires that 
three conditions are met, both of which are dependent on the state’s contractual and 
commercial abilities (Iossa and Martimort, 2012).  
 
First, the payment to the operator must be determined by whether, and the extent to 
which, the infrastructure and services specified in the contract are available for use, and are 
at the agreed standard (Farquharson et al, 2011). If the payment is linked to key 
performance indicators that are well-specified and measurable, adequate arrangements are 
in place for monitoring and verifying performance, and contractual relations are equitable 
between the parties (Lonsdale and Watson, 2007), then failures to achieve specified 
outcomes should result in financial losses for the private operator. It has a strong incentive 
to avoid losses and, so, deliver on its obligations. 
 
                                                          
2 A comprehensive evaluation of the globally influential ‘Alzira’ model can be found in Accerete et al (2012). 
4 
 
Second, as the payment mechanism places a ceiling on the operator’s total revenues, there 
is an incentive for the operator to minimise production costs (thereby maximising profits). A 
distinctive feature of PPPs is that they ‘bundle’ together a range of activities – the design, 
construction, operations and maintenance of assets, alongside a range of services – in a 
single contract, such that the operator has the capability, as well as the incentive, to exploit 
economies of scope (Iossa and Martimort, 2012), eg by investing in innovations which lower 
production costs (Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser, 2009).  
 
Finally, if, in addition, the structure of the market permits an adequate level of competition 
between bidders, bidders are able to foresee the opportunities to minimise production 
costs through the exploitation of economies of scope, and state purchasers are sufficiently 
well-resourced to negotiate effectively, then this incentive framework should generate 
downward pressure on the prices quoted by bidders, and therefore the final contract price 
borne by taxpayers. 
 
The emphasis placed on risk and incentives in the financial case for PPPs reflects the fact 
that large-scale government investment projects are frequently characterised by higher 
than expected costs and/or lower than expected benefits. Flyvbjerg et al (2002) attribute 
this to strategic behaviour by government actors in a context in which information is poor, 
and there are inadequate processes of independent scrutiny and challenge. For example, 
state planners may deliberately underestimate future costs and overestimate benefits in 
order to increase the likelihood that favoured initiatives are able to proceed (strategic 
misrepresentation). Other factors originate in strategic behaviour by market actors, which 
are facilitated by asymmetric information. For example, in a conventional procurement in 
which the risk of cost overruns is borne by the state, the bidder has an incentive to offer a 
lower price than it actually intends to charge, such that the ‘wrong’ bids are selected (a case 
of adverse selection). Similarly, in the post-contractual phase, the operator may take actions 
that reduce, in ways that the state may find it difficult to observe or counteract, the 
quantity or quality of output (a case of moral hazard).  
 
Transferring financial risk to the operator can address some of these problems. When the 
operator bears a risk, it has an incentive to reduce the magnitude and severity of it. If actual 
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production costs are higher than those the operator expected at the time of contract close 
and/or revenues are lower, eg because the quality of its services are verifiably lower than 
those contractually specified, it will fail to achieve its expected rate of return. This generates 
an accountability environment that may, more often than for alternative delivery 
mechanisms, lead to infrastructure being delivered to time and to budget, and human-
resource practices and management that reduce the erosion of social surpluses attributable 
to moral hazard (Hellowell et al, 2015). 
  
The operator of a PPP is financed with a mixture of equity and debt, but mostly debt. In 
cases where the costs of project delivery vary considerably from those expected at the time 
a deal is agreed, the operator may default on its debt, with serious implications for its 
shareholders and, in extreme cases, its lenders. As a result, lenders have an incentive to 
assess the robustness of business plans before contracts are signed, ensuring that forecasts 
of costs and revenues are robust, and risks are appropriately allocated. Lenders are unlikely 
to accept at face value the forecasts of managers and will seek independent advice when 
undertaking forecasting, due diligence and risk assessment. The involvement of lenders – as 
a source of independent scrutiny and challenge – plays a key role in addressing adverse 
selection, which is of benefit to shareholders and may lead to relatively good outcomes for 
the public sector (Hellowell et al, 2015). 
 
However, evidence shows that PPPs provide only a partial solution to problems of strategic 
behaviour – on both the provider and the purchaser side. The structure of the market 
before and after contracts are signed has been highlighted as an important variable in 
determining the distribution of market power between the parties (Colla et al, 2015). In 
particular, the degree of contestability during and after the procurement process can 
influence the types of contract relationships that develop, the nature of operation and how 
the economic gains from the partnership are divided. Where it is difficult to achieve 
competition in procurement, or it is difficult to cancel contracts in operation, due to the 
absence of other providers, private operators may have significant market power, with the 
effect that the ability of government purchasers to safeguard their interests (and/or those 
of service users) is reduced within the partnership. 
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2.1  POTENTIAL SOURCES OF HIGHER COSTS 
In addition to these limitations, there are several features of the PPP model which may 
generate additional financial costs. The most important of these are transaction costs and 
costs of using private capital. The majority of economic theorists examining these issues 
have taken a social welfare perspective when considering costs, eg Grout (2003); Reiss 
(2005); Iossa and Martimort (2012). Hence, analysis has generally focused on whether PPPs 
are likely to reduce consumption of society’s real resources in comparison with alternative 
procurement options – and not whether the price by the government purchaser (Hellowell, 
2015). There is very little theoretical research on this latter question, despite its apparent 
relevance for decision-makers. A notable exception is Ross and Yan (2015), in which it is 
recognised that the government’s objective may be to get a project delivered for the lowest 
financial cost to the government, rather than the maximization of total social surplus. 
 
2.1.1  TRANSACTION COSTS 
The Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) framework, pioneered by Oliver Williamson (1985; 
1990), has been used to provide an account of why complex contracts are likely to be 
associated with higher transaction costs than other forms of delivery (Lonsdale, 2005). In 
this framework, economic actors – buyers and sellers – are seen to be constrained by 
bounded rationality, while the self-interest orientation of all actors is characterised by 
opportunism, or ‘self-interest seeking with guile’ (Williamson, 1985, p.47-8). When 
opportunism on the part of buyers and sellers is combined with bounded rationality, either 
of the parties are liable to take advantage of gaps in the others’ knowledge to further their 
interests, at the expense of efficiency (Guasch et al, 2014; Lohmann and Rötzel, 2014; Qu 
and Loosemore, 2013) 
 
The impact of these behavioural factors on outcomes is dependent on two dimensions of 
the transaction: asset specificity, ie the extent to which investments by the parties are 
specific to the transaction, and uncertainty eg the extent to which current objectives are 
subject to change. In a private finance contract, both asset-specificity and uncertainty are 
relatively high. In the former case, both parties face considerable switching costs if they 
wish to withdraw from the deal (see section 3 for an example). In the latter case, the 
duration and scope of contracts ensure that, in a rapidly changing industry such as 
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healthcare, there is a strong likelihood of contractual incompleteness, and a need for 
renegotiation during the contract (Lonsdale, 2005). In this context, the TCE framework 
predicts that the processes of contract negotiation, and monitoring and evaluation, will be 
extensive and involve substantial financial costs for both buyers and sellers. 
 
There is some empirical evidence that supports this prediction. Dudkin and Välilä (2005), for 
example, showed that a sample of PPPs undertaken in the UK generated higher transaction 
costs in the pre-contractual phase – about 10% of the capital expenditure value of the 
project, on average, for both contracting authorities and preferred bidders, and up to 5% of 
that value for losing bidders – than other forms of procurement. They attributed this to 
their longer-term character, greater financial complexity and emphasis on risk-sharing, all of 
which tend to increase tendering and negotiating costs, and will often lead to limited 
competition both in and for the market, ie during procurement processes. 
 
2.1.2  THE PRIVATE COST OF CAPITAL 
The rates of return on private capital (debt and equity) may generate financial costs that are 
higher than those of other delivery mechanisms (Hellowell and Vecchi, 2012). The interest 
cost on private finance has been an important focus of academic research and official audit, 
(eg McKee et al, 2006; National Audit Office, 2015). This is normally a multiple of the 
interest rate that the government pays on its own borrowing. However, it is unclear that this 
is a relevant comparator, since borrowing is only one source of a government’s income, 
alongside taxes, fees, asset sales, interest on cash holdings, and so on, and hence the 
sources of funds for the marginal project is a weighted combination of these. Determining 
the right approach to estimating the cost of capital for government varies according to who 
is doing the analysis. From the perspective of a Ministry of Finance, the cost of capital is, in 
economic terms, equal to the opportunity cost – the value of the next best alternative 
government project. In contrast, from the point of view of a Ministry of Health, or an 
individual healthcare organisation, the cost of loans from national/sub-national 
governments, or from debt instruments issued directly by the organisation, may be more 
relevant comparators.  
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In both cases, evidence shows that the private operator’s weighted average cost of capital 
will often be in excess of this (Colla et al, 2015). In Africa, where domestic banks hold only 
short-term deposits, and other liabilities, an additional problem is the high price of long-
term domestic loans. Most social infrastructure projects require a repayment period of at 
least 15 years to be affordable (Hellowell and Vecchi 2012). Hence, while long term 
financing is essential, it is often not available in sub-Saharan Africa in, which, for instance, 
loan tenors are commonly five years or less, and even where longer-term financing is 
available, commercial lending interest rates are typically high in comparison with prices for 
comparable instruments in high-income countries (Irving and Manroth, 2009). 
  
2.2  GOVERNMENT COSTS AND RISKS 
Private finance contracts generate costs for the public sector over many years, but these are 
not well-captured by the budgeting system. In most developing countries, even a Medium-
Term Expenditure Framework involves a planning horizon of just three-years (Fӧlscher 
2007). For larger infrastructure projects, the associated costs for the public sector may be 
low (or zero) in this period however high they may be thereafter. The fact that the cost of 
projects is deferred to future budgeting periods may adversely influence the selection, 
specification and scale of investments, making it more difficult for allocative efficiency and 
long-run financial sustainability to be achieved. The scale of costs for government, and 
service users, that PPPs can give rise to, and their impact on sustainability, is a common 
theme in PPPs internationally (Monteiro, 2013; Acerete et al, 2009; Koppenjan and Enserink, 
2009; Shaoul et al, 2011).  
However, it is evident that, in Africa, the consequences of adverse selection may often be 
more severe than in the comparatively well-resourced welfare states of OECD countries.  
2.3  SUMMARY  
The section above allows three theoretical propositions to be advanced in relation to the 
opportunities and challenges associated with the PPP model in Africa. The first is that, 
because of the financial incentives they generate, PPPs may generate positive outcomes in 
terms of the efficiency and quality of services delivered. The second, is that positive 
outcomes are likely to be moderated (and adverse outcomes exacerbated) by weaknesses in 
the commercial capacities of the state. The third, is that contract prices will be high, as 
finance prices are subject to upward pressure from capital market constraints, while 
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budgeting inadequacies that fail to capture these means that PPPs will often impact 
adversely on the sustainability of the state’s financial position.  
The following case study provides evidence in relation to these theoretical propositions. 
 
3  CASE STUDY: A LARGE ‘INTEGRATED’ PPP FOR A NEW REFERRAL HOSPITAL IN MASERU, LESOTHO 
In January 2007, the Government of Lesotho initiated the tender for a contractor to replace 
the ageing national referral hospital, the Queen Elizabeth II, and upgrade a network of 
primary care facilities. On 27th October 2008, it signed a contract with Tsepong, a 
consortium led by Netcare Hospital Group, a South African healthcare provider, to design, 
build, finance and operate a 425-bed national referral facility, the Queen ‘Mamohato 
Memorial Hospital – QMMH, and a gateway clinic adjacent to the hospital. The project 
would also refurbish and re-equip three urban ‘filter’ clinics: Qoaling, Mabote and Likotsi 
(Vian et al, 2013).  
 
As at financial close, the total capital expenditure requirement of the project was estimated 
by Tsepong at M1,164,541 (US$134.98 million in 2017 dollars). In return for delivering the 
specified assets and providing a comprehensive range of clinical services in the hospital, 
Tsepong has received a unitary fee from the government, covering interest payments and 
profits for the private operator and the cost of infrastructure-related and clinical services. 
This is identified in the contract as M255,550,143 (or US$29.61 million in 2017 dollars). In 
principle, this is payable as, when, and to the extent that the outputs specified in the 
contract are delivered at the agreed standard. Independent monitors were appointed to 
evaluate the quality of construction and operations, and structures were established in the 
contract for joint oversight by Tsepong and the government. Use of the facility is free to 
patients at the point of delivery, except for a small co-payment (for the non-poor) in respect 
of some services. These fees ultimately go to the government, though Tsepong retains 10% 
of the fees to cover its administration costs (Vian et al, 2013). 
 
Table 2. Details of funding sources, funding uses, revenues and returns    
SOURCES 
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M’000 % 
Government Grant (excl. VAT) 400,000 34.3 
Commercial Debt – Drawdowns 589,830 50.6 
Commercial Debt – Capitalised Interest 70,622 6.1    
Mezzanine Debt 
  
DBSA 56,207 4.8 
Netcare 37,472 3.2    
Shareholders Contribution 
  
LEE Equity 6,245 0.5 
Netcare Equity 4,164 0.4    
TOTAL 1,164,541 100    
USES 
  
 
M’000 % 
Building Costs 737,121 63.3 
Equipment  208,183 17.9 
Commissioning Costs 98,854 8.5 
Capitalised Interest 70,622 6.1 
Other 49,761 4.3    
TOTAL 1,164,541 100    
REVENUES AND RETURNS % 
 
  
 
The Contractually-Specified Unitary Fee 255,550  
Nominal equity IRR (after Advance Company Tax)  25.2 
Interest rate on mezzanine debt  13.1 
Interest rate on commercial debt  11.62 
   
Source: Government of Lesotho (2009) 
 
The terms of the contract required both the government and the operator to contribute to 
the capital expenditure requirement (Downs et al, 2013). Direct government capital of 
M400 million was provided to co-finance construction, and a further M86 million was paid 
for improvements to the construction site itself. Private capital of M765 million financed the 
majority of capital expenditure. Of this, a loan provided by the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa (DBSA) accounted for 86% of the capital expenditure, at an interest rate of 
11.62%. The DBSA and Netcare also provided subordinated debt, of M56.2 million and 
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M37.5 million, respectively, which accounted for 12.2% of total capital expenditure. This 
portion of the debt, which is ‘junior’ to the senior tranche – so that, if Tsepong experiences 
a cash-flow shortfall, payments to senior debt are prioritised over those to the mezzanine 
debt – was provided at an annual interest rate of 13.1% (Government of Lesotho, 2009). 
 
Finally, Netcare and a group of regional investors, based in both Lesotho and neighbouring 
South Africa, provided equity capital of M10.41 million. Of this, Netcare provided M4.16 
million and local investors M6.25 million. Hence, Netcare is the largest shareholder, with 
40% of equity. When the contract was signed, the forecast Internal Rate of Return on all 
shareholder capital was 25.2%. It should be noted, however, that actual returns may have 
been higher or lower than this rate, and this information is not in the public domain. 
 
These returns are higher than is normal for comparable PPPs in the advanced economies. In 
the UK, for example, the Internal Rate of Return on equity capital has been in the range of 
12-18% (Hellowell, 2013) – and research has shown that this range has been sufficient to 
provide shareholders with excess returns – illustrated, for example, in high windfall profits 
when shares are sold in the secondary market (National Audit Office, 2012). This supports 
the proposition that economic variables common to developing countries, such as capital 
market constraints, macroeconomic risks and political uncertainty, are likely to increase the 
cost of capital on PPPs in such contexts – and thus the final cost of contracts to the 
associated government. 
 
Of great importance for the evaluation of the project is its capital structure: a debt-to-equity 
ratio of 86/14. This is normal for a health sector PPP in a high-income country, but high for a 
contract that incorporates full clinical services provision, and located in a country where 
experience with PPP is limited. A high debt-to-equity ratio (gearing) has various short-term 
advantages for the main contractual counterparties. For the public purchaser, a higher 
gearing lowers the operator’s cost of capital and reduces the minimum fee that the 
operator is able to accept – since, for a given fee, the operator will achieve a higher return 
to equity with higher gearing. However, the fact that the operator is so thinly capitalised 
reduces its ability to bear risk, making is less likely that scheduled debt payments can be 
made if cash-flows fall below the expected level. This increases the probability that the 
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sponsor will default on its debt – an eventuality that did in fact occur, as will be described in 
sections below.  
 
3.1  SERVICE PROVISION AND OPERATOR REMUNERATION 
The three filter clinics began operating in May 2010, and the hospital opened in October 
2011. The care delivered within these facilities includes the full range of services normally 
expected in a referral hospital of this scale in Africa, though it omits some services that a 
large hospital would normally provide in a high-income context, including treatments such 
as transplants, joint replacements, dialysis, cardiac surgery (with the exception of 
emergency procedures), chemotherapy and radiotherapy, obstetrics and gynaecology, 
plastic surgery and dentistry (Vian, 2013). 
 
The contract specifies that the operator will be paid an annual unitary fee of M255,550,143 
(see Table 1). The fee can be adjusted if services are verifiably failing to meet basic 
standards, as outlined in a range of key performance indicators applying to each listed 
service (Vian, 2013). To this extent, the structure of the deal resembles that of an 
‘availability-based’ contract as commonly used in more developed economies, such as 
Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. However, a distinctive feature of this contract is 
that the fee can vary according to the level of activity. The fee can vary within defined 
parameters according to the extent that outputs specified in the contract are delivered by 
the operator. 
 
There is a minimum number of patients (the lower demand parameter) and a maximum 
number (the upper demand parameter) to be treated per year. These parameters are 
broken down into inpatients and outpatients (Vian et al, 2013).3 The contract defines the 
penalties to be levied if there is ‘under-performance’ in service-provision, ie the number of 
treatments is  lower than the demand parameter, and also defines the additional fees to be 
                                                          
3 In effect, the fee is set to provide Tsepong with sufficient income to finance the functions of the business, 
including expected returns to equity and debt, for the actual level of activity. In health financing terms, the fee 
resembles a retrospective global budget rather than a prospective treatment-based payment. However, in 
accordance with the principle of risk transfer, this also includes an element of performance-based payment. 
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paid if there is ‘over-performance’, ie the number of treatments is greater than the  upper 
demand parameter.  
 
Table 1. Demand parameters for inpatients and outpatients 
 Lower parameter Upper parameter 
Inpatients 16,500 20,000 
Outpatients 258,000 310,000 
Total 274,500 330,000 
Source: Vian et al, 2013 
 
In each of the years of operation, the number of patients treated by Tsepong has been 
higher than the upper parameter in respect of both inpatients and outpatients. In 2011 and 
2012, Tsepong chose to defer fees for these treatments. However, it has chosen to invoice 
the government for additional treatments since the beginning of 2013. Patient numbers 
exceeded the upper parameter by 25% in that year (see table 5 for the financial impact of 
this).  
 
In addition, the contract defines the mechanism by which the fee is adjusted for inflation. 
This mechanism has two notable features. First, the index is applied to the entire fee, so 
that the indexed proportion of the fee is greater than the proportion of Tsepong’s costs, 
which vary with inflation (Government of Lesotho, 2009). This ‘over-indexation’ reduces the 
fee in the early years of the contract, but increases the total payment to be made over the 
contract period, and creates a risk for the government that inflation will be higher on 
average than forecast at the point of financial close (while Tsepong’s nominal returns are 
exposed if the opposite occurs). Second, the index is weighted towards Lesotho CPI and a 
Composite Medical Index (consisting of Lesotho CPI plus the difference between South 
African Medical CPIX and South African CPIX) (Marriot, 2014), and therefore fails to 
generate a fee that is in step with Tsepong’s production costs. 
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This is a concern for the Ministry of Health because its own budget is unlikely to 
move in step with the fee – the key parameters of which are general and medical inflation in 
South Africa. Conversely, it creates a risk for Tsepong that its production costs are not 
reflected in the unitary fee. For example, if there are changes in the price of local labour and 
supplies, these may not be adequately captured in the index, with the result that the fee is 
too low to finance the functions of the business. This occurred in 2013, when the 
government implemented a substantial increase in civil service wages, along with a re-
grading process that also increased labour costs. The implementation of these policies led to 
pressure on Tsepong to increase wages in an attempt to avoid the aggravation of existing 
recruitment and retention problems, and maintain adequate qualified staff (see section 3.5 
for more detail).  
 
3.2  THE NATURE OF THE MARKET THROUGH WHICH THE CONTRACT WAS ESTABLISHED  
Only two consortia, both anchored by South African hospital operators, Netcare and Life 
Healthcare, submitted responses to the government’s Request for Proposals (RfP) document 
(Downs, 2013). At the conclusion of the RfP evaluation process, it was determined that both 
bids had significant weaknesses and that neither was compliant with RfP objectives 
(Government of Lesotho, 2007). As a result, on 30th October 2007, the government asked 
for stronger and more detailed bids for the project in a request for Best and Final Offers 
(RfBAFO). It is apparent from this document that the government was, at this point in the 
procurement process, proposing a materially different project from the one implemented-in 
terms of its nature, scale and costs, the proportion of private financing involved, and the 
annual payment that the government perceived that it was able and willing to make. 
 
The most notable points that emerge from this comparison are:  
1 In the RfBAFO, the expected total capital expenditure requirement (capex) is 
identified as approximately M500 million, including VAT. This is less than half the 
capital expenditure requirement recorded in the financial model, of M1.165 billion. 
Although clear evidence is lacking, it appears that the government decided to add a 
further filter clinic, a gateway clinic and a number of additional services, such as a 
neonatal intensive-care unit, laparoscopy, neurosurgery, and MRI facilities, to the 
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output specification at some point during the period of non-competitive exclusive 
negotiations with Tsepong, implying that the technical solutions related to these 
outputs, and associated prices, were determined in the absence of competition.  
 
2 At the time of the RfBAFO, it was expected that public capital of M400 million, 
including VAT, would account for 80% of capex. It was anticipated that only 20% of 
the capital (or M100 million) would be raised by the operator. In the financial model 
of 20th March 2009, Tsepong records the proportions as 34.3% public finance against 
65.7% private finance, or M765 million in private sector equity and loans. 
 
3 In the RfBAFO, the government recorded its assessment of the affordable fee at 
M180.4 million per year, excluding VAT. In contrast, the financial model specifies the 
initial unitary fee (stated in 7th April 2007 terms) as M255.6 million, excluding VAT.4 
 
The key points of this comparison are summarised in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Comparison of financial values between RfBAFO and Financial Close 
Financial variables Financial values expected at 
RfBAFO (30 October 2007)  
Financial values recorded at 
Financial Close (20 March 
2009)* 
Capital expenditure M500 million M1,165 million 
Public versus private 
financing 
M400/M100 million (80% 
public versus 20% private) 
M400/M764.5 million (34.3% 
public versus 65.7% private) 
Expected unitary fee 180.4 M255.6 
* Note all figures are in 7th April 2007 monetary values 
Sources: The Kingdom of Lesotho, New Referral Hospital Public Private Partnership, 
Request for Best and Final Offers, 30 October 2007; and Tsepong (Pty) Ltd, Kingdom of 
Lesotho, New Referral Hospital Financial Model, Financial Close Version 6.01. 
                                                          
4 Because of the 100% application of an inflation index, discussed below, the actual amounts paid from the first 
year of operation in 2011/12 were considerably higher than this amount. 
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Clearly, these points are related: the growth in the capital expenditure requirement during 
the final months of negotiation increased the proportion of private financing required, and, 
together with certain additional services, and changes in the cost of capital, led to an 
increase in the initial unitary fee.  
 
On 14th December 2007, the Netcare-led consortium was appointed preferred bidder. This 
was followed by a 10 month period of bilateral negotiations, and the contract was signed on 
27th October 2008, with financial close on 20 March 2009. It was during this non-
competitive period that the above-mentioned changes to the scale and structure of the 
contract were agreed. Thus, there is a question about the extent to which the output 
specification and contract price can be regarded as having been competitively determined. 
It is notable that, in other government procurement markets, making changes of this scale 
during the preferred bidder process would be unlawful. For instance, under European Union 
procurement regulations, bidders may only ‘fine tune, specify and clarify’ their bids at this 
stage, reflecting a concern that such negotiations can undermine the degree of competition. 
 
In addition, during this period of final negotiations, the DBSA changed its financing terms, 
from 7% to 11.62% (Government of Lesotho, 2009). Again, it is notable that this change – 
ostensibly, a result of changing base rates during the early onset of the global financial crisis 
– was made in the absence of any competitive pressure, either on the borrower (Tsepong) 
or on the lender (the DBSA). 
 
3.3  THE INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY SURROUNDING THE CONTRACT 
The contract includes provisions for an extensive monitoring framework to assess Tsepong’s 
performance against a large number of key performance indicators. There are five key 
strands to this framework:  
1 An Independent Monitor has been employed to conduct quarterly assessments of 
performance, and make recommendations about the appropriate penalty (if any) to 
be applied to the unitary fee.  
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2 Internal monitoring is conducted by Tsepong, which drafts a monthly report on 
aspects of performance such as the volume of services provided, patient and family 
satisfaction, local economic empowerment indicators and staff training.  
3 The Ministry of Health is allowed to monitor performance; though in practice, it has 
very limited capacity to do so (UNICEF and World Bank, 2017).5  
4 A Joint Services Committee, with representation from Tsepong and the government, 
is tasked with reviewing performance towards specified targets, and considering the 
case for any needed modification of the PPP agreement.  
5 The private operator must obtain and maintain accreditation by COHSASA, the 
Council for Health Service Accreditation of Southern Africa. If Tsepong fails to 
maintain accreditation, the Ministry of Health has a right to terminate the contract 
(Vian, 2013). 
This is perhaps the strongest element of the contractual management system. In order to 
achieve accreditation, healthcare providers need to achieve a compliance rate of 80% 
against International Health Standards, with all areas designated as ‘critical’ being 
compliant. The new hospital obtained the COHSASA accreditation for compliance in 
November 2013 with an overall score of 94%. The three filter clinics were accredited by 
COHSASA earlier in 2013 with a score of 89% (Vian et al, 2015). This accreditation was not 
previously attained by any health facility in Lesotho, and by only one other public hospital in 
the region besides South Africa. The accreditation process should give the MoH comfort that 
the hospital is delivering a high standard of medical care. COHSASA’s standards are 
considered demanding by regional standards. However, COHSASA cannot hold Tsepong to 
account over its delivery of the contract. This part of the monitoring arrangements can exert 
pressure on Tsepong to deliver high quality care, but it cannot ensure that the incentive 
framework intended to be generated by the contract’s payment mechanism is effective.  
 
3.4  THE OUTCOMES FROM THE PROJECT: INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICE-DELIVERY AND BUDGETARY IMPACT 
                                                          
5 Currently only two full-time Ministry of Health employees manage all of its outsourced services, including the 
QMMH, which collectively account for over 52% of the total amount it spends (Unicef and World Bank, 2017) 
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The filter clinics opened in May 2010, and the hospital in October 2011. In both cases, 
construction was completed ahead of schedule, indicating that the contract was successful 
in transferring asset-related risks to Tsepong. There is also evidence that Tsepong is 
delivering services of higher quality than was the case in the old Queen Elizabeth II hospital 
(Table 2).  
 
Table 4. Comparison of clinical outcomes and productivity at the PPP in 2012 compared 
with equivalent measures in the former public facilities 
 
 PPP facilities Former public 
facilities 
% difference 
Hospital beds 390 409 -5% 
Filter clinic beds 24 8 200% 
Total beds 414 417 -1% 
Inpatient admissions 
(hospital) 
23,341 15,465 51% 
Inpatient days 
(hospital) 
116,648 91,808 27% 
Outpatient visits (incl. 
filter clinics) 
374,669 165,584 126% 
Deliveries (incl. filter 
clinics) 
7,431 5,116 45% 
Average length of stay 5 days 5.94 -16% 
Bed occupancy rate 82% 61% 33% 
Death rate (incl. filter 
clinics) 
7.1% 12% -41% 
Maternity death rate 
(incl. filter clinics) 
0.21% 0.24% -10% 
Paediatric pneumonia 
death rate (hospital) 
11.9% 34.4% -65% 
Still birth rate 
(hospital) 
3.1% 4% -22% 
Survival of very low 
birth weight infants 
(=1,500g) 
69.8% n/a n/a 
C-section rate (incl. 
filter clinics) 
26.8% 7.2% 272% 
Patient satisfaction 
rate (incl. filter clinics) 
86% 70.7% 22% 
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Source: Adapted from World Bank, 2013 
 
There is strong evidence that the introduction of strong management systems and protocols 
have played an important role in the achievement of higher quality and quantity of care in 
the new facilities. For example, Vian et al (2015) show that, at both the hospital and the 
filter clinic sites, new policies and guidelines have enhanced the quality of services delivery 
by outlining and setting standards and holding individual staff accountable for compliance. 
 
However, there is a question about whether these positive outcomes have been driven by 
the payment mechanism itself or, conversely, Tsepong’s willingness to perform effectively 
(combined, perhaps, with the need to achieve COHSASA accreditation). It is evident that the 
Ministry of Health has limited ability to deploy the contract as a regulatory mechanism 
(World Bank, 2013), creating the potential for moral hazard, and undermining the incentives 
at the heart of the financial case for the PPP (as described above). At the same time, the 
project is clearly of very high strategic value for Netcare as a multinational corporation. At a 
presentation to investors in March 2012, Richard Friedland, CEO of Netcare, said of the PPP:  
 
We see this [the Lesotho PPP] as the future of healthcare delivery, not just on the rest of the 
African continent but in our own country [South Africa] as well. 
 
It is surely beneficial to have in place a private operator that has a strong corporate 
commitment to good project performance. And it is of significance that an operator may be 
motivated to achieve a successful project in the absence of financial incentives to do so. One 
might, however, have concerns that such motivation may not be sustained over the contract 
period, in which, for example, corporate strategies may change as macroeconomic 
developments occur, and new personnel, with less personal association with the project, 
become influential.  
  
3.5  BUDGETARY IMPACT 
It is notable that the government and its advisors chose to proceed with the PPP contract, 
despite the increase in the annual unitary fee from the ‘affordability threshold’ of M180.4 
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million to M255.6 million during the final stages of bidding – a 42% increase. Overall, the 
amounts paid to Tsepong by the MoH during the operation of the contract have been 
considerably higher than was forecast at the point of financial close. This is for four main 
reasons: 
 
1 The payment is inflation-indexed. The related adjustment is applied to the entire 
unitary fee – and other parts of the payment – rather than only that proportion of 
the payment relating to Tsepong’s variable costs, ie the costs that are affected by 
changes in the price level (Yescombe, 2016). The result of this ‘over-indexation’ is to 
make the unitary charge lower in the early years and higher in the later years than 
would otherwise be the case. This factor alone led to a 68% increase in the fee, from 
M255.6 million in 2008/09, to M439.4 million in 2015/16, net of Value Added Tax 
(VAT) (UNICEF and World Bank, 2017). 
 
2 The unitary fee recorded in the financial model is net of VAT; but, in fact, the MoH 
must pay a rate of 14% on the contract price (Vian et al, 2013). Hence, MoH 
expenditure on the contract, gross of VAT, was M517 million in 2015-16. 
 
3 The contract sets the annual ‘upper demand parameters’ at 20,000 for inpatients 
and 310,000 for outpatients. Treatment of patients in excess of these parameters 
leads to higher payments, of M9,491.64 (including VAT) per inpatient and M57 
(including VAT) per outpatients. In practice, the volume of treatment has exceeded 
these upper demand parameters (by several thousand inpatients, and several tens of 
thousands of outpatients) in every year of the contract’s operation up to the latest 
year for which we have data (2015/16).The Ministry of Finance has not budgeted for 
the additional services to be paid, and it has only partially paid them or paid them 
with a substantial delay (UNICEF and World Bank, 2017). 
 
21 
 
4 There are a number of other elements of the cost. As noted in (3), the government 
has not always been able to execute the payment on time, and Tsepong has the right 
to charge interest on any outstanding fees. In addition, there have been several 
instances of Tsepong defaulting on the DBSA loan, due to missed or delayed 
payments. As a consequence of this, the DBSA has charged Tsepong late payment 
fees, and these have been passed on to the government in the form of higher fees. 
In addition, there remain several issues affecting the PPP that are currently under 
arbitration – including, among others, interest charged on late payments, some 
components of the payments for additional treatments, the inflation rate for patient 
co-payments, and the rise in health workers’ salaries in 2013. In 2013, the 
government increased salaries for doctors (by 40%), assistant nurses (by 70%), and 
full nurses (by 50%). Netcare claimed that this was ‘unforeseen conduct’ by the 
government, and made a claim for compensation (Unicef and World Bank, 2017). As 
Tsepong is entirely dependent on the PPP contract for its income, and the level of 
this income is indexed by a formula that is only weakly linked to changing wages in 
the local market for clinical labour, it did not increase its own staff salaries equally. 
That has created staff recruitment and retention problems for Netcare, as well as 
periodic industrial action by staff. In addition, it is clear that, once settled, these 
issues could eventually have significant financial implications for the Ministry of 
Health. 
As Table 5 shows, the combination of these four factors has led to great volatility in the 
amounts invoiced by Tsepong. The table also highlights that there has been an increasing 
tendency for the MoH to pay less than the amounts invoiced by Tsepong (particularly in 
relation to 2015/16, in which all payments due for treatments above the upper demand 
parameter have not been paid (UNICEF and World Bank, 2017). This raises a question of 
whether the shortfall in payments will at some stage have to be corrected, with potentially 
significant financial implications for the MoH. 
 
Table 5. Actual MoH expenditure on Tsepong 
Financial 
Year 
Invoiced 
Amount 
(M) 
Actual 
Expenditure 
Actual 
Expenditure 
% 
Annual 
Increase 
Amounts 
Invoiced 
minus 
% Annual 
Increase in 
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(net of VAT) 
(M) 
(gross of 
VAT) (M) 
in 
Invoiced 
Amount 
Actual 
Expenditure 
(gross of 
VAT) (M) 
Actual 
Expenditure 
2012/13 435.55 409.86 463.35 - -27.8 - 
2013/14 575.3 463.58 533.41 32 41.89 13.1 
2014/15 598.12 482.44 555.12 4 43 4.1 
2015/16 641.99 439.42 517.01 7.3 124.98 -8.9- 
Source: Invoices submitted via Tsepong to the MoH, via UNICEF and World Bank, 2017 
 
There is a clear view among some development stakeholders that rising expenditures on 
Tsepong have rendered the PPP contract financially unsustainable, especially when set 
against the priority of addressing the burden of HIV/AIDS in the country – the prevalence of 
which is, at 26.4%, more than four times the average for sub-Saharan Africa (UNICEF and 
World Bank, 2017). The Queen Mamohato Memorial Hospital is not accredited to provide 
treatment and follow up for HIV-positive patients, though its filter clinics can do so.6 It is 
also evident that from the perspective of broader efforts to strengthen the healthcare 
system in Lesotho, the decision to prioritise high-end services in the capital over rural clinics 
and preventive medicine is a dubious one. Overall, QMMH doctors constitute close to half of 
all the doctors in Lesotho ( UNICEF and World Bank, 2017).When accounting for district 
population, per capita expenditure on health in Maseru (at M995 per capita) is double the 
amount of the second-place district, Qacha’s Nek (M460) (ibid). While there is pressure on 
the government to reallocate doctors to underserved districts to ensure patients have 
sufficient access to needed healthcare, it is evident that the non-discretionary nature of the 
payment to Tsepong makes such a move towards allocative efficiency harder to achieve. 
 
4  CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
 
Theory and evidence both predict that the PPP model will deliver good outcomes in terms of 
the cost and quality of infrastructure and services (proposition 1). However, they may create 
additional costs and risks for government (proposition 2) – and such adverse outcomes are 
likely to be aggravated when government capacity is limited and there is a lack of providers 
                                                          
6 HIV/AIDS is, by a considerable margin, the major cause of mortality in Lesotho, with 41.4 percent of deaths 
(adults and children included) in Lesotho attributed to HIV/AIDS in 2014 ( UNICEF and World Bank, 2017). 
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capable of delivering the contract (proposition 3). The case study outlined in this chapter 
largely validates these propositions. In Lesotho, new healthcare facilities were delivered on 
time, to budget and in accordance with the output specification. In addition, early analyses 
of the hospital’s performance indicate higher levels of utilisation, clinical quality and patient 
satisfaction than pertained in the previous national referral hospital, QEI. Although it is not 
possible to know whether the prices paid for these outcomes are higher than would have 
been achieved via alternative delivery mechanisms, proposition 1 is substantially borne out. 
 
However, the case study also highlights the scale of the additional financial risks that PPPs 
can give rise to, and their potential to impact on the state’s capacity to achieve allocative 
efficiency, in line with proposition 2. Further, the case supports proposition 3, which 
predicts that, in a context of limited government and market capacity, and ineffective 
scrutiny of plans for, and behaviour in relation to, the contract, such PPPs can pose a threat 
to the ability of policymakers to meet their wider social objectives. In this case, the 
government and its advisers chose to proceed with the PPP despite strong evidence that the 
future costs were rising well beyond the level regarded as affordable ex ante. It is also 
apparent that the structure of the contract has served to generate highly volatile 
expenditures and a great deal of budgetary uncertainty, and is likely to continue to do so 
over the contract period.  
 
Debates about whether a particular asset or service is ‘affordable’ are complicated by the 
fact that ‘affordability’ has no precise economic meaning. In standard welfare economics, an 
individual's willingness to pay for goods or service is the focus of study, and economists are 
generally not interested in whether someone has the ability to pay. However, in the public 
policy literature, analysis of affordability normally focuses on what has to be foregone in 
order to obtain the goods under consideration, and whether this is reasonable or excessive. 
In the health sector, what is foregone may be regarded as excessive if it compromises in 
some way the ability of government to address priority health needs. Precise information on 
those foregone benefits, especially in relation to allocations to address the country’s 
HIV/AIDS burden, is necessary to assess more comprehensively whether the costs borne by 
the government of Lesotho are ‘affordable’. 
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For advocates of private sector-oriented development policy, this is an important 
learning point. Private finance – and engagement with the private sector more generally – 
can play an important role in helping governments address their social infrastructure gap, 
potentially improving both investment decisions and service delivery. But this may also 
create avenues for self-interested state and private sector employees to take actions that 
undermine the public interest. Development agencies that advocate for the expansion of 
PPPs in such settings should ensure that governments have adequate budgetary capacity to 
support the substantial expenditures that large-scale capital-intensive PPPs can generate. 
Governments in the African region should ensure that highly ambitious projects, such as the 
one studied in this chapter, proceed only on the basis of rigorous and independent scrutiny 
of project plans and forecasts, and that they have adequate budgetary institutions and 
mechanisms in place to support the expenditures generated. Major investments in these 
areas may be required, alongside those relating to asset delivery and the management of 
the project over the long term. 
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